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1Abstract
Inbred line seed producers face competition from their own consumers: farmers who save
part of their harvest can costly self-produce. To reduce this competition, seed producers can
switch to non-durable hybrid seed production.
In a two-period model, we investigate what is the impact of crop durability on self-
production, pricing strategies and switching decision. We ﬁrst study the pricing decisions and
switching decisions of an inbred line seed monopoly. Then, we analyze how the monopoly’s
behavior is aﬀected by the entry of a hybrid seed producer. We also examine how the
introduction of royalties on farmers who self-produce improves eﬃciency.
Our main ﬁnding is that, for some constellation of costs, an inbred line seed monopoly
has an incentive to produce technologically dominated hybrid seed in order to extract more
surplus from farmers. Along the same lines, an inbred line monopoly has an incentive to let
a hybrid seed producer enters the market for discrimination purposes.
Keywords: Durable good, non-durable good, royalties.
JEL classiﬁcation: Q16 (R&D and agricultural technology); L12 (Monopoly); L13 (Oligopoly)
21 Introduction
Property rights in the seed sector in Europe and North-America are based on the Plant Breeder’s
Right (PBR) that allows farmers to use the harvest of one production cycle in order to have
some seed for the next production cycle, thereby self-producing seed. Table 1 below shows that
the proportion of self-produced seed is important for several crops (e.g., wheat). Farmers buy a
particular seed for its own genetic trait properties (e.g., productivity, resistance to insecticide,
to pest attack, ﬁtness to a speciﬁc climate). When self-producing seeds, farmers produce crop
with same trait and they compete with seed dealers on their own demand. In this sense, crop
trait can be considered as a durable good.
One way to avoid competition by farmers through seed self-production is to reduce the
durability of crop traits. If the quality of the trait decreases dramatically from one generation
to the other, self-production becomes unproductive. This can be achieved by developing hybrid
seed (as opposed to inbred line seed).1 This strategy has been followed for corn since the
1950’s, sunﬂower during the 1970’s, and more recently for canola (with partial success) and
wheat (without success). With the recent development of biotechnology, companies have tried
to develop some genetical artefacts that make sterile the seed harvested by farmers, such as the
controversial “Terminator” seed.
Recently, the regulation in Europe has reformed intellectual property rights (IPRs) in the
seed sector by allowing licence fees on crop traits. More precisely, the E.U. directive 2100/94
(article 14) indicates that a producer that self-produces his own seed should pay a royalty fee
to the innovator that has created the seed. In France, the directive has been applied for wheat
since 2001, through a tax on the harvest (0.5 Euro per ton, i.e., 4-5 Euros per ha). This tax
is not levied or reimbursed if the farmer buys his seed or if he cultivates small surfaces. In
accordance with the European directive, a large part of the collected taxes are assigned to the
seed company that has created the seed varieties.
We consider a two-period model of crop trait durability. We investigate the impact of crop
durability, as well as royalties, on self-production, crop traits, pricing strategies and decisions
to reduce crop durability by switching to hybrid seeds. We also examine how royalties on crop
traits improve eﬃciency.
1In genetic terms, inbred line seed are homozogous. The consequence is that if an inbred line is self-pollinated,
its oﬀspring is genetically homogeneous and identical to the parent inbred line. Hybrid seed are heterozygous
and results (generally) from the cross of two diﬀerent inbred lines. Hybrid seed performance is greater than the
performance of the two inbred parental lines. When an hybrid is self-pollinated, its oﬀspring is heterogeneous
with an average performance closer to the performance of the inbred parental lines (i.e., less than the original
hybrid performance).
3Crop Seed boughta Type of seed
Corn 100% 100% hybrid
Wheat 20-32% 100% inbred line
Rice 85% ?
Barley 50% 100% inbred line
Oats 40% 100% inbred line
Soybean 76% 100% inbred line
Canola 20% hybrid / 80% inbred line
Sunﬂower 95% 100% hybrid
a proportion of seed bought by the farmers in the US (source:
McMullen (1987) reported in Lichtenberg (2000)).
Table 1: Seed markets and seed type in the U.S.
We consider two types of seed: inbred line and hybrid seeds. Farmers can self-produce
inbred line seed but not hybrid seed. We assume that farmers are heterogeneous in their seed
self-production costs and that seed producers are more eﬃcient in producing seeds than (most)
farmers. Self-production is thus sub-optimal but it indeed occurs to compete with powerful
(e.g., monopolistic) seed dealers. We also assume that hybrid seed is more costly to produce (by
seed producer) but, once planted, it is more productive (for farmers) than inbred line seed. We
therefore impose no a priori technological domination of one seed on the other as it will become
a main parameter of the model.
We ﬁrst analyze a monopolistic seed industry where only inbred line seed is produced,
whereby the monopoly commits on future prices. Due to trait durability, she cuts second-period
prices in order to reduce self-production from farmers. Consequently, she extracts strictly less
than if the traits were non-durable, i.e., the non-durable monopoly proﬁt.
We then assume that the monopoly cannot commit on second-period price. Because farm-
ers make seed self-production decisions before observing seed second-period prices, crop trait
durability creates a hold-up problem, which entails eﬃciency losses as well as a reduction of
the monopoly’s market power. The monopoly would like to commit to reduce her price in the
second period to reduce self-production. However, once farmers have decide not to save part of
their harvest to self-produce their seed, they represent a captive demand and thus the monopoly
rises her price up to the one-period monopoly pricing. Expecting this behavior, all farmers self-
produce their seed, which is ineﬃcient. The introduction of royalty, by making self-production
less attractive, increases the eﬃciency. It also assigns all eﬃciency gains to the monopoly. When
4the royalty fee is equal to the one-period monopoly mark-up (i.e., monopoly price net of marginal
cost), it allows the monopoly to extract all the surplus.
Second, we investigate the implications of the introduction of hybrid seed in the case of
non-commitment on future prices. We ﬁrst consider that the monopoly cannot produce both
inbred line and hybrid seeds, rather she can choose either to switch to hybrid seed production, or
keep producing inbred line seed. We show that the monopoly seed producer has an incentive to
introduce technological dominated hybrid seed (i.e., hybrid seed less productive than inbred line
seed) in order to extract more surplus from farmers. She indeed decides to ineﬃciently shorten
the durability of the crop. Furthermore, we show that the introduction of royalties reduces the
incentive for the monopoly to switch to ineﬃcient hybrid. Yet, the monopoly switches to hybrid
when it is eﬃcient to do so only for a royalty fee equals to the one-period monopoly mark-up.
Second, we suppose that the monopoly can produce both inbred line and hybrid seeds. We
show that the monopoly sells both technologically dominated hybrid seed and inbred line seed
to discriminate among farmers.
Lastly, we introduce duopoly price competition among an inbred line seed producer and a
hybrid seed producer. We show that, when hybrid seed is less eﬃcient than inbred line seed, it
leads to a diﬀerentiated market structure with both types of seed. This equilibrium is ineﬃcient
because some farmers self-producer seeds whereas the rest of the farmers use technologically
dominated hybrid seeds. A licence fee on self-produced seeds has no impact on the eﬃciency of
the economy nor on the inbred line seed dealer’s proﬁt.
It is important to keep in mind that royalties on crop traits are motivated by property rights
on innovations. The goal of such a regulation is that the seed producer gets a full return on his
investment in R&D leading to new crop traits, e.g., the monopoly proﬁt yields by a non-durable
trait. Accordingly, in our paper, we examine the impact of such a regulation not only on the
seed dealer’s proﬁt, but also on the ex-post eﬃciency of the entire society.
We restrict ourself to the monopoly and diﬀerentiated duopoly cases because intellectual
property right favor market power. Also because, in our framework, perfect competition leads
to ex-post eﬃciency. In other words, ex-post ineﬃciencies are due to the exercise of market
power. However, ex-ante eﬃcient might require ex-post market power due to strong intellectual
property right to foster innovation.
Our contribution is related to the literature on durable goods. The Coase conjecture states
that monopoly pricing of durable goods leads to exhaustion of the monopoly rent. It is due
to the fact that the monopoly cannot commit not to reduce prices in the future to attract the
residual demand. The monopoly would like to commit on high prices (e.g., monopoly price) but
then is tempted to cut prices to attract the residual demand until it reaches its marginal cost.
5Expecting this behavior consumers will buy at most at marginal cost (Coase, 1972, Bulow, 1982,
Gul et al., 1986, Waldman, 2003).
Here, the problem is diﬀerent. First, the good can be sold during each period as a non-
durable good. It is indeed what the monopoly would like to do. She must then commit to set
prices low in the future. Second, since farmers must save and stock part of their harvest to
self-produce seed, their choice to render the good durable occurs before observing future prices.
Those who have not saved crop are captive demand: they have no choice but to buy again
the good. The monopoly is thus tempted to increase her price in the future to hold-up those
farmers. Expecting this behavior, all farmers save their harvest and self-produce seed. Thus,
conversely to the standard durable good problem, the lack of commitment on future prices leads
to a higher (and not lower) price in the future.
As in the durable good case, the presence of a potential entrant helps the durable good
producer to commit on future prices (Ausuble and Deneckere, 1987, Gul, 1987). For durable
good, it helps to commit on higher prices and thus restores the monopoly power. Here, it bounds
the price upward and thus partly solves the hold-up problem.
Shortening crop traits durability is similar to planned obsolescence of durable goods. Bulow
(1986) has formalized the monopoly’s incentive to shorten uneconomically the durability of goods
in a two-period model. Our framework is diﬀerent in two points. First, we deal with a good that
leaves the option for consumers to make it durable at a cost. The monopoly wants to introduce
uneconomical good that does not provide this option. Second, consumers have heterogeneous
beneﬁts captured by seed production costs when they have the option to make the good durable.
As a consequence, for some parameters, the monopoly chooses to produce both types of good
to diﬀerentiate consumers.
Ozertan et al. (2002) examine the property rights protection of genetic modiﬁed (GM) crops
in a two-period model. They compare sterile GM seeds with short term and long term contract
between the seed producer and the farmers as strategies to protect intellectual property rights.
Their focus is mainly on the enforcement and monitoring problems with long term contacts that
can be avoided with sterile GM seeds. Here, we abstract for these problems when licence fees
are introduced. Rather, we focus on the ineﬃciency due to the exercise of market power and the
self-production of seed. In our model, the choice to introduce non-durable (sterile GM) seed is
endogenous, and the monopoly can decide to introduce non-durable seed even though it is less
eﬃcient than durable seed.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is exposed in section 2. Section 3 is devoted to
the analysis of the inbred line seed monopoly. We ﬁrst deﬁne the pricing strategies when she can
commit on future prices, and second in the non-commitment case. We thus investigate how the
6introduction of a royalty fee aﬀects our ﬁndings. Section 4 focuses on the introduction of hybrid
seed. We ﬁrst consider that the monopoly can only switch from inbred line seed production to
hybrid seed production. We investigate how this new strategy can alter the monopoly behavior.
We then allow for multi-seed production and thus investigate whether the monopoly chooses to
produce one or both kinds of seed. In section 5 we analyze a situation in which the monopoly
produces only inbred line seed, and a competitor can enter the market with hybrid seed. Section
6 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a two-period model in which seed producers face a continuum of farmers of mass 1.
Discount factor is normalized to 1. Each farmer buys zero or one units of seed. One or several
seed dealers produce and sell inbred line seeds (L) at a marginal cost normalized to be 0. As
the technology becomes available (at no cost), they may also produce and sell hybrid seeds (H)
at a higher marginal cost c>0. Farmers get diﬀerent gross payoﬀs from buying inbred line
seed or hybrid seed, i.e., Πj with j = H,L where ΠH > ΠL. Thus, hybrid seeds generate higher
proﬁt, but are more costly to produce. Yet, we assume that hybrid is worth to be adopted, i.e.,
ΠH − c>0.
Not only the two kinds of seeds have diﬀerent costs and proﬁts, they also diﬀer in their
durability. Unlike hybrid seeds, the inbred line harvest (i.e., the output) can be saved and used
to produce seeds for the next period production (as an input). If a farmer buys the inbred line
seeds at the beginning of the ﬁrst period, he produces his own second-period seeds at a cost θ
that includes the cost of saving part of the harvest. Importantly, farmers diﬀer in their cost of
producing inbred line seeds. We assume that θ is distributed according to some density f(θ)
with cumulative function F(θ)o n[ 0 ,θ], where F(0) = 0 and F(θ)=1 .T h u sF(θ) is the fraction
of farmers with a cost less than θ. To simplify the analysis we assume that the distribution is
uniform and that θ ≤ ΠL.
Since seed dealers have lower seed production costs, seed production by farmers is ineﬃcient.
In other words, at the ﬁrst-best, all seeds are produced by seed dealers. The two-period welfare
achieved is thus 2ΠL with inbred line seed and 2(ΠH − c) with hybrid seed. Moreover, still
at the ﬁrst-best, hybrid line seed must be adopted whenever ΠH − c ≥ ΠL or, equivalently,
ΠH − ΠL ≡ ∆Π ≥ c, i.e., the gain of harvest compensates the incremental cost of producing
hybrid line seeds.
In our model, the ﬁrst-best outcome is achieved with perfect competition in the inbred line
seed market, even though a monopoly can produce hybrid seeds. Producers set their price at
7marginal cost 0. Farmers buy during each period, as it would be more costly to self-produce
the seed (θ ≥ 0). In order to enter the market, a hybrid seed producer has to set her price at
∆Π (such that ΠH − p =Π L) or possibly just below, i.e., ∆Π − ε.I f∆ Π<c , the hybrid seed
producer does not enter and only inbred line seeds are produced. On the other hand, if ∆Π ≥ c,
entry occurs, and only hybrid seeds are produced. In this latter case, all farmers buy the hybrid
line seeds, and the (maximized) total surplus is shared between farmers and the hybrid seed
producer. Furthermore, hybrid seeds are eﬃciently produced. Therefore, any loss of eﬃciency
in seed pricing or in the reduction of trait durability is due to the exercise of market power in
the inbred line seed industry.
3 Inbred line monopoly
As a benchmark case, we consider a monopoly that only sells inbred line seeds. We assume
ﬁrst that she can commit in the ﬁrst period to future prices, and then we investigate the non-
commitment case.
3.1 Inbred line monopoly with commitment on second-period price
The monopoly oﬀers a pair of prices {p1L,p 2L} where p1L (respectively, p2L) is the ﬁrst-period
(respectively, second-period) price. The farmers observe these prices, each of them decides
whether or not to buy the seeds in the ﬁrst period at price p1L and then each decides whether
or not to self-produce for the second period. Those who do not save part of the harvest in the
ﬁrst period, have to decide whether to buy the seeds in the second period at price p2L.
To fully understand the monopoly’s pricing strategy, we ﬁrst consider the case of homoge-
neous farmers, i.e., when they all have the same cost θ. While committing on a price schedule,
the monopoly can adopt two diﬀerent strategies. Either she sells the seed as a “durable good”
in the ﬁrst period to be used for the two periods and therefore sells nothing at period two
(“durable good” strategy) or, rather she sells seeds during the two periods (“non durable good”
strategy). In the ﬁrst case, the ﬁrst-period price is equal to the two-period seed value, namely2
p1L =2 Π L − θ. The monopoly gets the entire surplus whereas farmers get none of it. However,
since seeds are ineﬃciently self-produced by farmers, the total surplus can be increased if the
monopoly sells seeds in the second period. In this case (which is the non durable good strategy),
in the second period the monopoly faces farmers’ competition, which forces the second-period
price to be equal to the farmers’ cost, i.e., p2L = θ (if higher, farmers produce their own seed).
2The second-period price is set high enough (e.g., p2L >θ ) to induce farmer to self-produce seeds.
8In the ﬁrst period, the monopoly exerts her full market power by selling the one-period seed
at its one-period value, i.e., p1L =Π L. The total surplus is maximized but shared between
the monopoly who gets (ΠL + θ) and farmers who get (ΠL − θ). Hence, the monopoly has to
choose between an ineﬃcient outcome (durable good strategy), where she gets all the surplus,
and an eﬃcient one (non-durable good strategy), where she shares the surplus. The choice of
the monopoly between the two above pricing strategies depends on the level of the farmers’
self-production cost, θ. The monopoly only sells in the ﬁrst period (respectively, sells during the
two periods) when θ ≤ ΠL
2 (respectively, θ ≥ ΠL
2 ).
With heterogeneous farmers, the monopoly faces a similar trade-oﬀ: either she oﬀers the
seed as a durable good (to be used in the two periods), or she oﬀers the seed during the two
periods as a non-durable good.
A durable good monopoly sets her prices such as to sell to all the farmers in the ﬁrst period,
and to none of them in the second period. A farmer whose self-production cost is θ buys in the
ﬁrst period if ΠL − p1L +Π L − θ ≥ 0. Hence, there exists a   θ cost farmer who is indiﬀerent







    θ
0 f(θ)dθ
subject to   θ =m i n {2ΠL − p1L, ¯ θ}
With ¯ θ ≤ ΠL, the solution is a corner solution3 pc
1L =2 Π L− ¯ θ. At this price, the monopoly sells
to all farmers and gets a payoﬀ of 2ΠL − ¯ θ, whereas farmers get a null payoﬀ.
A non-durable good monopoly sells the seeds during the two periods. In the second period,
only farmers with high self-production cost will buy the seeds. In this setting, two constraints
must be satisﬁed: the monopoly has to make sure that farmers buy in the ﬁrst period (ΠL−p1L ≥
0) and that some farmers will buy in the second period (ΠL − p2L ≥ ΠL − θ). Hence, the non-
durable good monopoly program is

   





  θ f(θ)dθ]
subject to ΠL − p1L ≥ 0,
and   θ =m i n {p2L, ¯ θ}.








3This corner solution is due to the uniform distribution. If most farmers have low θ, the monopoly might
prefers to raise prices, thereby excluding farmers with high θ.
9With the above pricing schedule, the monopoly sells to all farmers in the ﬁrst period and only
to half of them (i.e., those whose θ is larger than
¯ θ
2) in the second period. She makes a proﬁt of
ΠL +
¯ θ
4 whereas farmers get ΠL −
¯ θ
4.
To summarize, the monopoly can adopt a durable good strategy and gets a payoﬀ of (2ΠL−¯ θ),
or adopt a non-durable good strategy and gets a payoﬀ of (ΠL + ¯ θ/4). Hence, she has to choose
between those two strategies. So long as ¯ θ ≥ 4
5ΠL, she adopts the non-durable good strategy and
thus sells during the two periods.This strategy allows her to extract more surplus, even if there
is an ineﬃciency loss due to self-production in the second period. Indeed, in the second period,
the monopoly sells to half of the farmers (those with higher self-production costs) to decrease
this ineﬃciency loss but at a cost of reducing the surplus extracted from those who produce
their own seeds (who then gets a positive payoﬀ). On the other hand, as long as ¯ θ<4
5ΠL,s h e
adopts the durable good strategy and thus sells only seeds in the ﬁrst period. This leads to an
ineﬃcient outcome, as all the farmers ineﬃciently self-produce in the second period.
In the extreme case where ¯ θ =Π L, the monopoly chooses the non-durable good strategy,
and sells seeds during the two periods. Her total two-period payoﬀ is 5
4ΠL.T h ef a r m e r sw i t h
high self-producing costs (i.e., θ ≥   θ = ΠL
2 ) buy the inbred line seed in the second period,
whereas the rest of them, with low cost (i.e., θ<  θ) self-produce their own seed. In the ﬁrst
period, each farmer gets a null payoﬀ, whereas in the second period, each of those who buy
seeds gets
ΠL
2 , while the others get each ΠL − θ. The farmers’ total two-period payoﬀ is thus
    θ
0 (ΠL − θ)f(θ)dθ +
  θ
  θ (ΠL − pc
2L)f(θ)dθ = 5
8ΠL.
3.2 Inbred line monopoly without commitment on second-period price
We now consider that the monopoly cannot commit on future prices. Thus, the timing is the
following:
• In the ﬁrst period, the monopoly sets the ﬁrst-period price, p1L. The farmers observe the
ﬁrst-period price and each of them decides whether or not to buy inbred line seed. Then,
each farmer decides whether or not to save some seed to self-produce in the second period.
• In the second period, the monopoly sets the second-period price, p2L. The farmers observe
the price, and each of those who do not self-produce has to decide whether or not to buy
the seed.
In absence of any commitment device, we solve the two-period model backward, and we
determine the Subgame Perfect equilibrium. Compared to the commitment case, farmers face a
hold-up problem. In the second period, the farmers who did not save their harvest to produce
10their own seed are captive consumers for the seed producer. Therefore, the monopoly can set
pm
2L =Π L. Expecting that price, none of the farmers buy the second period seed because they
are better oﬀ if they produce their own seed as ΠL −pm
2L < ΠL −θ is always satisﬁed. Although
lower second-period price will induce some farmers not to save and, therefore, to buy from the
monopoly in the second period. However, this cannot be an equilibrium as the monopoly will
always be tempted to raise her price in the second period up to ΠL, forcing farmers to buy
at this price. Anticipating this behavior, all the farmers will save seed in the ﬁrst period for
the second period production. We now turn to the ﬁrst-period pricing strategy. Given that all
farmers self-produce their seed, the monopoly will sell a durable good in the ﬁrst-period. The




  ˜ θ
0 f(θ)dθ s.t.   θ =m a x {2ΠL − p1L, ¯ θ}
The solution is still the corner solution pm
1L =2 Π L − ¯ θ.
Hence, the Subgame Perfect equilibrium is such that the monopoly sells seed as a durable
good at price pm
1L =2 Π L− ¯ θ, and all the farmers save some of the seed from the ﬁrst period and
use it in the second period. None of them buy in the second period at the price pm
2L =Π L.
Since farmers ineﬃciently self-produce seeds, the monopoly outcome is ineﬃcient, and even
more ineﬃcient than in the commitment case. This is due to the hold-up problem arising because
of the lack of commitment in the second-period price. Now, seeds are self-produced not only by
farmers with high cost, but also by those with low cost to avoid to be captive and, therefore,
they have not choice but to buy at price ΠL. Both seed producer and farmers are worse oﬀ
because of this hold-up/commitment problem.
Remark 1 Notice that the decrease from the ﬁrst-period price to the second-period price is
not due to the standard durable good commitment problem but rather to the hold-up problem.
Indeed, here, the monopoly is tempted to increase her second-period price because the demand
she faces is captive, whereas in the standard durable good/Coase problem, she is tempted to
decrease it to serve more consumers.
Remark 2 The case where the monopoly cannot commit on prices but farmers observe
prices before deciding whether to self-produce seed or not is equivalent to the commitment case.
Remark 3 Notice also that, in reality, new farmers enter the market in each period. In our
setting, new farmers should enter during each period so that prices are 2ΠL − ¯ θ in every period
and farmers buy every two periods. Maybe it is worth to extend the model to an inﬁnity of
periods with half of the farmers entering during each period.
The two-period payoﬀ of the monopoly is 2ΠL − ¯ θ, whereas each farmer whose cost is θ gets
a payoﬀ of ¯ θ − θ, so that the farmers’ surplus is ¯ θ − E[θ]=
¯ θ
2. The total welfare is 2ΠL −
¯ θ
2 and
11thus the welfare loss is the expected cost
¯ θ
2 (recall that the ﬁrst-best welfare is 2ΠL).
3.3 Monopoly pricing strategy with royalties
We now investigate the impact of a given royalty fee τ paid by farmers that produce their own
seed on the pricing strategy of the monopoly. We assume that 0 <τ≤ ΠL.
If the monopoly chooses the durable good strategy, the imposition of a royalty fee does not
change our ﬁndings. Indeed, the monopoly simply accounts for the royalty in her program. The
price paid by farmers, p1L + τ, is equal to 2ΠL − ¯ θ, and thus the monopoly proﬁt is unchanged,
2ΠL − ¯ θ.
However, the imposition of a royalty fee makes self-production more costly, and thus makes
the non-durable good strategy more attractive for the monopoly. To see that, consider the case
of non-commitment on second period price. As before, the lack of commitment implies that the
second-period price will be the highest possible, namely pm
2L =Π L. Expecting this price and
with the imposition of royalties, some farmers will not self-produce seeds. Figure 1 illustrates
this result.
Insert ﬁgure 1
Farmers with low production cost (i.e., θ<ΠL − τ) still prefer to self-produce, and they
only earn (ΠL − τ − θ), where τ is transferred to the monopoly in the second period. Farmers
with high self-production cost earn a negative proﬁt by self-producing, and consequently prefer
to earn no proﬁt and buy seed in the second period at price p2L =Π L. Note that some farmers
prefer to buy seed only if the royalty level is high enough (i.e., τ>ΠL − ¯ θ), which is always
true for ¯ θ =Π L. When choosing the non-durable good strategy, the monopoly earns ΠL in the
ﬁrst period and, using ﬁgure 1, we can see that her two-period payoﬀ is 2ΠL −
(ΠL−τ)2
¯ θ .
Comparing the two strategies, the monopoly prefers to sell seed as a non-durable good as soon
as some farmers are willing to buy seed at second-period price p2L =Π L (i.e., when τ>ΠL− ¯ θ).
When this condition is fulﬁlled, the monopoly earns more from the farmers who self-produce
a n df r o mt h o s ew h od on o t . 4 Note also that this choice leads to an increase in the total surplus,
4Consider ﬁrst the farmer who self-produces in both cases. For each unit, the monopoly earns 2ΠL − ¯ θ −τ +τ
if she sells as a durable good, and ΠL + τ if she sells as a non-durable good. In the former case, the monopoly
decreases her price when the royalty fee increases, but not in the second case. Hence, the proﬁt is greater in the
second case when the royalty level is high enough (τ>ΠL − ¯ θ). Consider now the farmer who buys seed in the
second period when the seed is sold as a non-durable good. For each unit the monopoly still earns 2ΠL − ¯ θ in the
ﬁrst case, and earns the full surplus 2ΠL in the latter case.
12since ineﬃcient farmers with high self-production cost buy seed that is eﬃciently produced. The
increase in the monopoly proﬁt is greater than the increase in the surplus because the monopoly
gets all the increase in surplus, plus the gain from the increased tax from self-producing farmers.
In the extreme case where τ =Π L, the monopoly extracts all the surplus. Only farmers with
null production costs self-produce and pay royalties. All the other farmers buy seed during each
period at the one-period monopoly price ΠL.
To sum-up (see ﬁgure 2), when τ ∈ (0,ΠL − ¯ θ], the monopoly sells seed only in the ﬁrst
period (as a durable good) at price 2ΠL − ¯ θ − τ and makes a proﬁt of 2ΠL − ¯ θ.T h e f a r m e r s
get a surplus
¯ θ
2 and the total surplus is thus 2ΠL −
¯ θ
2. With a royalty fee τ ∈ [ΠL − ¯ θ,ΠL], the
monopoly sells seed during both periods at prices pm
1L = pm
2L =Π L. Farmers get a total surplus
equal to what they save by self-producing, formally
  ˜ θ
0 ΠL −(θ+τ)dθ = 1
2¯ θ(ΠL −τ)2. The total
surplus (i.e., the sum of farmers and seed producer surplus) is then 2ΠL − 1
2¯ θ(ΠL − τ)2.T h e
ineﬃciency loss due to self-production is
  ˜ θ
0 θdθ = 1
2¯ θ(ΠL − τ)2.
Insert ﬁgure 2
We sum up the previous analysis in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 By reducing self-production, a royalty fee τ>ΠL − ¯ θ increases eﬃciency and
transfers more than the eﬃciency gain to the monopoly. When τ =Π L,e ﬃ c i e n c yi sr e s t o r e d
and the monopoly gets all the surplus.
Remark 4 If royalties are distributed to all through lump-sum subsidies, the eﬃciency gains
are then more equitably shared. Although it is not the purpose of this regulation which intends
to provide the seed producer a return on her investment in R&D, such a redistribution might
be more acceptable from the farmers’ point of view.
4 Introduction of hybrid seed
Suppose now that the hybrid seed becomes available exclusively to the monopoly at constant
marginal production cost c>0. Let ptj denote the price charged in period t =1 ,2 for seed
j = H,L (if sold). Each farmer has to decide which seed to buy. If he buys hybrid seed in the
ﬁrst period, he cannot use part of his ﬁrst-period harvest to produce seed for the second-period.
He has to buy either the inbred line at price p2L or the hybrid seed at price p2H to produce in
the second period.
13In this setting, we investigate under what circumstances the monopoly decides to switch
to hybrid production, or to produce both inbred line and hybrid seeds at the same time. We
thus investigate whether the inbred line producer introduces technologically dominated hybrid
seed. As a benchmark, we ﬁrst assume that the monopoly can only produce one kind of seed
(hybrid or inbred line) e.g., for technological, legal and/or marketing reasons. We then allow
the monopoly to sell both seeds.
4.1 Switching from inbred line seed to hybrid seed
We consider ﬁrst that the monopoly can only produce one type of seed: either inbred line seed
or hybrid seed. If the monopoly introduces hybrid seed in the ﬁrst period, she behaves as a non-
durable good monopoly and thus sets the monopoly price in each period, i.e., pm
1H = pm
2H =Π H.
None of the farmers can use their seed for the next period, and they all buy seeds at their
valuation, ΠH. The two-period beneﬁt of the monopoly is thus 2(ΠH −c) whereas farmers get a
null beneﬁt. If the monopoly keeps producing inbred line seed, so long as ¯ θ ≥ 4
5ΠL (respectively,
¯ θ<4
5ΠL), she adopts the non-durable good strategy (respectively, the durable good strategy)
and gets a two-period payoﬀ of ΠL +
¯ θ
4 (respectively, 2ΠL − ¯ θ).
T h u s ,s ol o n ga s¯ θ<4
5ΠL (respectively, ¯ θ ≥ 4
5ΠL) she switches to hybrid seed production in
the ﬁrst period5 if c ≤ ∆Π +
¯ θ




However, from a social viewpoint, hybrid should be produced only if c<∆Π+
¯ θ
4 for ¯ θ ≤ 4
5ΠL
or if c<∆Π for ¯ θ>4
5ΠL.
If ¯ θ<4
5ΠL, four areas can be deﬁned depending on the value of c (see Figure 3). (1)
If c<∆Π the monopoly switches to hybrid seed production, which is also the most eﬃcient
technology (ﬁrst-best choice). (2) If c ∈ [∆Π,∆Π +
¯ θ
4], the dominated hybrid seed is produced
by the monopoly. This is because, even if it is less eﬃcient, by avoiding self-production, hybrid
technology allows her to extract all the surplus. This switch is eﬃcient (i.e., leads to higher
surplus compared to inbred line seed) in a monopoly framework because the price schedule with





the dominated hybrid seed is still produced by the monopoly, for the same reason that in zone
(2). However, this switch is ineﬃcient because hybrid seed production is becoming excessively
ineﬃcient even if it avoids ineﬃcient self-production. (4) If c>∆Π +
¯ θ
2, the monopoly keeps
producing inbred line seed, which corresponds to an eﬃcient choice.
5We can think of a situation where the monopoly switches to hybrid seed production only in the second period
(i.e., while producing inbred line seed in the ﬁrst period). However this strategy is obviously dominated for the
seed producer viewpoint.
14Insert ﬁgure 3
We sum up this result in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 If c ∈ [∆Π,∆Π+
¯ θ
2], the monopoly switches to technologically dominated hybrid
seed. This switch is eﬃcient so long as c ≤ ∆Π +
¯ θ
4.
If ¯ θ ≥ 4
5ΠL, there exist only three diﬀerent areas. As before, if c<∆Π, the monopoly








does not switch to hybrid seed production as it is too expensive to do so. Thus, in this case, for
intermediate values of the marginal cost (i.e., c ∈ [∆Π,∆Π + 1
2ΠL −
¯ θ
8]), the monopoly always
switches ineﬃciently.
We now investigate whether royalties can provide to the monopoly with incentives to switch
to hybrid seed production when it is eﬃcient to do so in the case where ¯ θ ≤ 4
5ΠL.F i g u r e
3 represents how the four zones described earlier are aﬀected by the royalty level. When τ ∈
(0,ΠL−¯ θ], we already know that the royalty has no eﬀect on the monopoly equilibrium, including
prices, proﬁts and welfare. Thus, a royalty fee τ cannot give incentives to switch to hybrid seed
production. For τ ∈ [ΠL − ¯ θ,ΠL], the monopoly proﬁt and the total welfare depends on τ.T h e
monopoly switches to hybrid when c ≤ ∆Π +
(ΠL−τ)2
2¯ θ (zones 1, 2 and 3) whereas it is eﬃcient
to switch for c ≤ ∆Π +
(ΠL−τ)2
4¯ θ (zones 1 and 2). The “ineﬃciency zone”, [∆Π +
(ΠL−τ)2
4¯ θ ,∆Π +
(ΠL−τ)2
2¯ θ ] (zone 3) in which the monopoly switches to hybrid although it is eﬃcient to keep
producing inbred line seed with monopoly pricing, shrinks as τ increases. This is because higher
royalty fee increases the proﬁt of the inbred line seed monopoly, and, therefore, makes the
switch to dominated hybrid seed less attractive. Yet, this ineﬃciency zone exists as long as
τ<ΠL, meaning that imposing royalty does not always provide with incentives to eﬃciently
switch. The monopoly switches at the eﬃcient threshold only for the extreme value τ =Π L.
This corresponds to the case where there is no eﬃciency loss due to self-production and the
monopoly gets all the surplus from inbred line seed production.
Proposition 3 Royalty makes the monopoly switch ineﬃciently to hybrid less often. She always
switches eﬃciently only when the royalty allows her to capture all surplus with inbred line seeds,
i.e., τ =Π L.
154.2 Multi-seed production
We now analyze the case where the monopoly can sell both types of seeds.
Suppose ﬁrst that hybrid seed is more eﬃcient than inbred line seed (i.e., c<∆Π). The
monopoly has thus no incentive to sell both types of seed. Hybrid seed has two advantages:
it enables to have a higher proﬁt because of higher eﬃciency, and it enables to extract all the
surplus because it is non-durable in the sense that farmers are captive demand in the second-
period. The monopoly charges prices p1H = p2H =Π H and therefore earns 2(ΠH − c).
Conversely, assume that inbred line seed is more eﬃcient than hybrid seed (i.e., c>∆Π).
In the second period, the monopoly sells only inbred line seed at price p2L =Π L, which yields a
payoﬀ ΠL that is greater than ΠH−c. In the ﬁrst period, the picture is more complex. For given
ﬁrst-period prices of the two seeds, farmers with low self-production cost θ buy inbred line seed
and self-produce seed6 whereas those with high θ buy hybrid in the ﬁrst period and inbred line
seed at the second period. A farmer whose self production cost is θ chooses the ﬁrst strategy if
ΠL − p1L +Π L − θ ≥ ΠH − p1H +Π L − p2L, or, equivalently, if θ ≤ 2ΠL − ΠH − p1L + p1H ≡ ˜ θ.




  ˜ θ
0 f(θ)dθ +( p1H − c +Π L)
  ¯ θ
˜ θ f(θ)dθ
s.t ˜ θ =2 Π L − ΠH − p1L + p1H,
0 ≤ ˜ θ ≤ ¯ θ,
p1H ≤ ΠH,
p1L >p 1H − ∆Π.
The last constraint means that no farmer buys inbred line seed instead of hybrid seed in the
ﬁrst period, for a one period use only.
The objective function simpliﬁes to 1
¯ θ
 
˜ θ(2ΠL − ΠH + p1H − ˜ θ)+(¯ θ − ˜ θ)(p1H − c +Π L))
 
.
Note that it is equivalent to maximize the objective function on ˜ θ instead of p1L, so that the






¯ θ(p1H +Π L − c)+˜ θ(ΠL − ΠH + c − ˜ θ)
 
s.t ˜ θ =2 Π L − ΠH − p1L + p1H,
0 ≤ ˜ θ ≤ ¯ θ,
p1H ≤ ΠH,
p1L >p 1H − ∆Π.
The solutions are p1H =Π H and ˜ θ =m i n {1
2(c−∆Π), ¯ θ}.I f1
2(c−∆Π) < ¯ θ, the upward constraint
on ˜ θ is not bindingand therefore p1L = 1
2(3ΠL+ΠH−c). Otherwise, if 1
2(c−∆Π) ≥ ¯ θ, it is binding
6At the monopoly prices, the only reason to buy inbred line seed is to exploit its durability.
16and thus the monopoly sells only inbred line seed in the ﬁrst period at price p1L =2 Π L − ¯ θ.7
To summarize, the monopoly adopts the following pricing strategies. When ∆Π <c<
∆Π+2¯ θ, she sells both inbred line and hybrid seeds at respective prices p1L = 1
2(3ΠL +Π H −c)
and p1H =Π H in the ﬁrst period, and only inbred line seed in the second period at price
p2L =Π L. Farmers with seed production cost θ ≤ ˜ θ = 1
2(c − ∆Π) buy inbred line seed in the
ﬁrst period and produce their own seed for the second period. The rest of the farmers buy
hybrid seed in the ﬁrst period and inbred line seed in the second period. When c ≥ ∆Π + 2¯ θ,
the monopoly sells only inbred line seed at prices p1L =2 Π L − ¯ θ and p2L =Π L.
With a multi-seed monopoly, farmers θ ≤ ˜ θ = c−∆Π
2 get a surplus ˜ θ−θ by buying inbred line
seed and self-producing, whereas farmers θ ≥ ˜ θ buy both hybrid and inbred line seeds and make
no proﬁt. As a consequence, the monopoly extracts all the surplus ΠH from farmers who buy
hybrid seed but incurs production cost c and therefore loses c−∆Π when comparing with inbred
line seed sold at price ΠL. On the other hand, she shares surplus on those who buy inbred line
seed as a durable good.
Figure 4 is helpful to understand the gain and loss from the multi-seed strategy.
Insert ﬁgure 4











The ﬁrst term represents the eﬃciency loss due to self-production (zone I in ﬁgure 4) whereas
the second term represents the eﬃciency loss due to the use of the ineﬃcient hybrid seed (zone
II in ﬁgure 4). Furthermore, the above loss must be compared to the ineﬃciency loss due to
self-production from all farmers, formally
¯ θ
2. We conclude that it is eﬃcient to introduce hybrid
seed in a monopolistic industry when c ≤ ∆Π + 2¯ θ
3 . This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 4 When the monopoly has the option to sell both hybrid and inbred line seeds
during the same period, she introduces technologically dominated hybrid seed if c ∈ [∆Π,∆Π+2¯ θ].
This is eﬃcient only when c ≤ ∆Π + 2¯ θ
3 .
Even if inbred line seed is more eﬃcient, the monopoly can extract more surplus by also
selling hybrid seed. This is because when she produces only inbred line seed, she serves all the
7Note that since, by assumption, c − ∆Π > 0, the downward constraint on ˜ θ is never binding.
17demand.8 She thus has to match her price with the willingness to pay for a durable good of
the less eﬃcient farmers ¯ θ. With hybrid seed, she can discriminate farmers by serving the less
eﬃcient ones (i.e., those with high θ) with hybrid seed, thereby increasing price for the more
eﬃcient ones (i.e., those with low θ). Hence, she increases the rent extracted from the more
eﬃcient farmers.
Remark 5 Notice that if ¯ θ ≥ ΠL
2 , then the monopoly always produces both seeds when
hybrid seed is dominated. This is because ¯ θ ≥ ΠL
2 is equivalent to ΠH ≤ ∆Π + 2¯ θ and, since
c ≤ ΠH, it implies that c ≤ ∆Π + 2¯ θ. Indeed, ΠH ≥ ∆Π + 2¯ θ simpliﬁes to ¯ θ ≥ ΠL
2 .
Remark 6 By comparing results 2 and 4, we ﬁnd that if c ∈ [∆Π,∆Π + 2¯ θ], selling both
hybrid and inbred line seeds at period 1 enables to increase the monopoly proﬁt compared to
the case where only one type of seed is sold.
We now investigate the eﬀect of royalties on the decision to introduce hybrid seed. We ﬁrst
derive the optimal monopoly proﬁt with royalty when the monopoly sells both hybrid and inbred
line seeds. We then compare this proﬁt level with the proﬁt level when only inbred line seed are
produced.




  ˜ θ
0 f(θ)dθ +( p1H − c +Π L)
  ¯ θ
˜ θ f(θ)dθ
s.t.˜ θ =2 Π L − ΠH − (p1L + τ)+p1H,
0 ≤ ˜ θ ≤ ¯ θ,
p1H ≤ ΠH,
p1L >p 1H − ∆Π.
We focus here on the case where c is low enough (c<∆Π+2¯ θ) so that the constraint 0 ≤ ˜ θ ≤ ¯ θ
is not binding. The solutions are p1L =m a x {1
2(3ΠL +Π H − c) − τ,ΠL} and p1H =Π H.I f
τ<ΠL − c−ΠH
2 , the optimal inbred line seed price satisﬁes the last constraint (i.e., 1
2(3ΠL +
ΠH − c) >p 1H − ∆Π). The monopoly proﬁt is not aﬀected by the royalty fee because the
monopoly decreases the price charged to self-producing farmers by the same amount that the
royalty fee she gets from these farmers after they buy the seed. If τ>ΠL−
c−ΠH
2 , the constraint
p1L >p 1H − ∆Π is binding, so that the optimal inbred line seed price is ΠL. The monopoly
does not use hybrid seed as a discrimination device any longer because she can extract a larger
part of the self-producing farmers’ proﬁt with the high tax level.9 Note that the equilibrium is
then identical to the one we got earlier with a mono seed monopoly (cf. section 3.3.).
8This is the case at least when ¯ θ ≤ ΠL.
9If the monopoly chooses to sell hybrid seed, she would then choose p1L slightly higher than ΠL.O n l yf a r m e r s
with θ ≤ ΠL − τ would self produce. The monopoly proﬁt would be decreasing with τ as shown in ﬁgure 5.
18We now analyze how royalties aﬀect incentives to produce both hybrid and inbred line seed
in the ﬁrst period, instead of selling only inbred line seed. This comparison is made for low
enough values of c (c<∆Π + 2¯ θ) so that there is a potential interest for using hybrid seed.10
When selling both hybrid and inbred line seeds, we need to distinguish two cases depending on
the value of the royalty fee with respect to ΠL − c−ΠH
2 . When selling only inbred line seed,
two cases are possible depending on the value of the royalty fee with respect to ΠL − ¯ θ.I f
c<∆Π + 2¯ θ,w eh a v eΠ L − ¯ θ<ΠL − c−ΠH
2 , so that three cases need to be considered:
• If τ<ΠL − ¯ θ, the royalty does not aﬀect the monopoly proﬁt and the surplus with any
strategy (hybrid and inbred line seeds or only inbred line seed). The results are identical
to those obtained earlier with no royalty (see proposition 4).
• If τ ∈ [ΠL − ¯ θ,ΠL − c−∆Π
2 ], the royalty aﬀects the monopoly proﬁt and the surplus when
only inbred line seed is produced. The monopoly prefers to sell both hybrid and inbred
line seed in the ﬁrst period if
c<∆Π + 2¯ θ −
 
¯ θ2 − (ΠL − τ)2.
A comparison of the surplus enables us to show that surplus increases when both hybrid












• If τ>ΠL− c−∆Π
2 , the monopoly no longer chooses to produce both hybrid and inbred line
seeds in the ﬁrst period. However, we need also to consider that case where the monopoly
chooses to sell hybrid seed during the two periods. This trade-oﬀ between selling only
inbred line seed or only hybrid seed as been studied earlier, and we have shown that the
monopoly earns more by selling hybrid seed only if c is not too high (see results 2 and 3).
Figure 6 provides a synthetic representation of these three cases.
Insert ﬁgure 6
This strategy leads to a lower proﬁt than the one the monopoly gets by choosing p1L slightly lower than ΠL and
producing only inbred line seed in the ﬁrst period.
10If c>∆Π + 2¯ θ and there is no royalty, we have seen that the multi-seed monopoly prefers not to sell hybrid
seed and sell only inbred line seed as a durable good (p1L =2 Π L − ¯ θ). The situation is identical to the one we
studied before with a monopoly selling only inbred line seed. With a royalty and such high values of c,w eh a v e
seen that the monopoly will still prefer to sell inbred line seed.
19The arguments for areas (1) to (4) are identical to those provided for ﬁgure 3. Hence, when
τ>ΠL− c−∆Π
2 , we come back to the comparison of the mono-seed monopoly: this part of ﬁgure
6 is identical to ﬁgure 3.
Proposition 5 Royalties makes the monopoly switches ineﬃciently to hybrid less often. She
always switches eﬃciently only when the royalty allows her to capture all surplus with inbred
line seeds, i.e. τ =Π L.
5 Diﬀerentiated duopoly
We push further our investigation, and consider the case where the monopoly only produces
inbred line seed, and a potential entrant can produce hybrid seed. This may be due to the fact
that the inbred line producer cannot produce the hybrid seed (e.g., for technical or legal reasons),
but another producer can do it. In this setting, the two producers compete with diﬀerent seeds.
Each seed producer sets her price ptj in each period t =1 ,2f o rj = H,L. Prices are chosen
simultaneously.
Pricing strategies are diﬀerent once competition is introduced. In this new setting we investi-
gate whether technologically dominated seed is still introduced, why and how it aﬀects eﬃciency.
We also examine the impact of a licence fee on self-produced seed.
First, it is easy to show that if hybrid seed production is a better technology, i.e., c<∆Π,
only the hybrid producer survives in the market. In the second period, the hybrid producer sets
a price such that the inbred line producer is excluded from the market. Indeed, if p∗
2H =∆ Π−ε,
farmers only buy from the hybrid producer in the second period, i.e., ΠH − p∗
2H > ΠL − p2L for
any price p2L > 0. On the other hand, farmers never self-produce seed as ΠH − p∗
2H > ΠL − θ
is always satisﬁed for any θ>0. In the ﬁrst period, the hybrid producer sets the same price
p∗
1H =∆ Π− ε and thus gets all the demand. In this case, only hybrid seeds are produced and
farmers cannot produce seeds.
Second, consider the case where both seeds are as eﬃcient for one period, i.e., c =∆ Π . I n
the second period, seed producers are in a one-period Bertrand competition with heterogenous
products. Prices are set to p2L =0a n dp2H = c. Producers share the second-period demand.
Expecting those prices, no farmer self-produce seed since self-production costs exceed seed prices.
Therefore, all farmers buy seed as non-durable good in the ﬁrst period. Seed producers are thus
also in an one-period Bertrand competition in the ﬁrst period. They set their prices at p2L =0
and p2H = c and share the total demand.
If both seeds are as eﬃcient, the competition is so hard that prices match ﬁrms’ seed produc-
tion costs. As a consequence, no farmer self-produce seeds. Firms are in a Bertrand competition
20in each period.
Third, consider the case where inbred line seeds are more eﬃcient than hybrid seeds, i.e.,
c ≥ ∆Π. The equilibrium is such that only inbred line seed is sold in the second period. Indeed, in
the second period, the farmers who did not self-produce are captive. Seed producers are in a one-
period Bertrand competition on this captive demand. Since inbred line seed dominates hybrid
seed, the inbred line producer can set a low price to capture all the demand, p∗
2L = c − ∆Π −  
(with   close to 0). The hybrid producer has no demand even if she sets her price at marginal
cost c. Farmers always buy from inbred line producer as ΠH − c<ΠL − p∗
2L if they do not
self-produce. However, those whose θ is lower than p∗
2L = c − ∆Π will self-produce.
In the ﬁrst period, seed producers are engaged in a price competition with diﬀerentiated
seeds, one being with durable genetic trait. Farmers rank seeds according to their self-production
costs: those with low θ have a higher willingness to pay for the durable seed. Inbred line seed
producer targets farmers with low θ who then self-produce seed whereas hybrid producer sells to
those with high θ who buy seeds during each period. Formally, with ﬁrst-period prices, farmer θ
prefers to buy inbred line seed and self-produce seed rather than buying hybrid seed in the ﬁrst
period and inbred line seed in the second period if ΠL − p1L +Π L − θ ≥ ΠH − p1H +Π L − p2L.
Therefore, all farmers with θ ≤   θ ≡ min{p1H − p1L + c − 2∆Π, ¯ θ} buy inbred line seed. Thus,




    θ
0 f(θ)dθ + p∗
2L
  ¯ θ
  θ f(θ)dθ. (1)
When choosing her ﬁrst-period price, the inbred line seed producer trade-oﬀs ﬁrst period proﬁts
with the second period ones. By ﬁxing lower ﬁrst period prices, she attracts more consumers
in the ﬁrst period who are willing to self-produce seeds. But those farmers will not buy seed in
the second period and, therefore, the second-period demand and proﬁt will be reduced. When
  θ<¯ θ, the ﬁrst-order condition yields the inbred line seed producer’s best response to any price
p1H
p1L =
2c − 3∆Π + p1H
2
. (2)




  ¯ θ
˜ θ f(θ)dθ.
When   θ<¯ θ, the ﬁrst-order condition yields the hybrid seed producer’s best response to any
price p1L
p1H =
¯ θ + p1L
2
+∆ Π . (3)














1H) are the equilibrium prices when selling at price pe
1H is proﬁtable for the
hybrid seed producer, that is when pe
1H is higher than marginal cost c. In the opposite case
pe
1H <c , meaning that c>∆Π+2¯ θ, then the hybrid seed producer has no choice but to charge
at marginal cost pc
1H = c whereas the inbred line seed producer chooses her best response to
this price, pc
1L = 3
2(c − ∆Π). The hybrid seed producer is thus excluded from the market and
  θ = ¯ θ. All farmers buy inbred line seed as a durable good because, since c>∆Π + 2¯ θ,t h e
second-period price p∗
2L = c − ∆Π is higher than the highest self-production cost ¯ θ.
To sum-up, when ∆Π <c≤ ∆Π + 2¯ θ, seed producers compete in price in a diﬀerentiated
market. Farmers with low seed production costs buy inbred line seed in the ﬁrst period and
self-produce seed for the second period. Farmers with high production costs buy hybrid seed
in the ﬁrst period and inbred line seed in the second period. When c>∆Π + 2¯ θ, the hybrid
seed producer is excluded from the market. The inbred line seed producer sells seed in the ﬁrst
period to all farmers who then self-produce seed.
In any case, duopoly pricing leads to ineﬃcient seed self-production by farmers as long as
c>∆Π. Moreover, farmers who do not self-produce seed buy technologically dominated hybrid
seed which is also ineﬃcient. Thus if c>∆Π, the presence of hybrid seed reduces self-production
but to the detriment of using an ineﬃcient technology. Moreover, the threat of competition from
the hybrid seed producer in the second period bounds the inbred line second-period price. It
thus mitigates the hold-up problem highlighted in the monopoly inbred line with no commitment
case to the beneﬁt of the inbred line producer.
Now, what is the impact of a royalty fee on seed self-production in this duopoly equilibrium?
It is easy to show that a licence fee τ>0 has no impact on seed prices and market structure.




    θ(τ)
0 f(θ)dθ + p∗
2L
  ¯ θ
  θ(τ) f(θ)dθ (4)
with   θ(τ) ≡ min{p1H − (p1L + τ)+c − 2∆Π, ¯ θ}. In this diﬀerentiated market, farmers buy
more expensive inbred line seed because they expect to self-produce seed so that the total price
they pay is p1L + τ ≡ pτ. This amount goes into the producer’s pocket. It also determines
who buys inbred line seed and self-produces and who buys seed in both periods. The inbred
line producer adapts her pricing strategy accordingly: she reduces p1L when τ increases to let
p1L+τ be unchanged. Formally, replacing p1L+τ by pτ in the objective function in (4) yields the
maximization program (1). Then the inbred line seed producer’s best response and equilibrium
22price can be computed the same way. Hence, the licence fee does not increase the eﬃciency nor
the inbred line producer’s proﬁt in a duopoly competition.
Proposition 6 When ∆Π + 2¯ θ ≥ c>∆Π, in a duopoly competition, the inbred line seed pro-
ducer sells her product as a durable good to farmers with low self-production cost whereas the
hybrid seed producer sells only to farmers who use seed as a non-durable good. This diﬀerentiated
market structure is ineﬃcient because self-produced seeds as well as hybrid seeds are technolog-
ically dominated. A licence fee on self-produced seeds has no impact on the market equilibrium
and, therefore on its eﬃciency.
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24Figure 1: Second period surplus sharing with inbred line monopoly, no commitment, and
tax (if τ ≤ ΠL − ¯ θ)
Self-producing farmer surplus
Monopoly proﬁt from the tax
Monopoly proﬁt from the sell of inbred line
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ΠL =1 , ¯ θ =0 .8,τ =0 .4
25Figure 2: Eﬀect of tax on the monopoly proﬁt and surplus with no commitment
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ΠL =1 , ¯ θ =0 .8,c− ∆Π = 0.15
26Figure 3: Choice of the type of seed by a mono-seed monopoly with tax (with non commit-
ment when selling inbred only)
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ΠL =1 , ¯ θ =0 .8,∆Π = 0.2
27Figure 4: Two periods surplus sharing when the monopoly sells both inbred and hybrid at
the period 1 (multiseed monopoly)
Self-producing farmer surplus
Monopoly proﬁt from selling inbred at period 1
Monopoly proﬁt from selling hybrid at period 1















ΠL =1 , ¯ θ =0 .8,∆Π = 0.2,c=0 .6
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28Figure 5: Monopoly proﬁt and surplus with multi-seed monopoly, tax (and no commitment
when selling inbred line only) (c>∆Π + 4¯ θ
3 )
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ΠL =1 , ¯ θ =0 .8,c=1 ,∆Π = 0.2
29Figure 6: Choice of the type of seed by a multiseed monopoly with tax (with non commit-
ment when selling inbred only)
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